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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03
COLOMBO 000021
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
RELEASABLE TO: UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND
SWITZERLAND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS
CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA - ELECTIONS UPDATE
NO. 6
REF: A. COLOMBO 11
¶B. COLOMBO 7
¶C. COLOMBO 2
¶D. 09 COLOMBO 1152
¶E. 09 COLOMBO 1145
¶F. 09 COLOMBO 1139
COLOMBO 00000021 001.8 OF 003
Classified By: CHARGE VALERIE C. FOWLER.
REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
Fonseka's Manifesto
-------------------
¶1. (C) Presidential candidate Sarath
Fonseka released his
campaign 'manifesto' on January 7, a full-color
22-page
brochure, which contained a strong
condemnation of President
Rajapaksa, largely on grounds of
corruption and family
patronage. Post contacts have said the
manifesto would be
published in all three local languages
and widely
distributed. The manifesto talks about
'believable change'
and contains promises on economic
reform, government reform
and social welfare improvements. As
detailed below,
Fonseka's publication is rather thin on
explanations of how
he intends to pay for many of the economic
and social-welfare
initiatives he promises. There are a
number of other
governmental reforms, however, which
could be implemented
with little or no financial burden on
the government.
Whether or not a victorious President
Fonseka would have the
political capital needed to achieve
these reforms remains to
be seen and would be dependent on a
compliant parliament.
With parliamentary elections due within
several months, the
exact shape of any future Fonseka-era
parliament is far from
clear at present.
KEY PROMISES
------------
¶2. (C) The Fonseka manifesto promises a
number of
governmental reforms, which if carried
out would appear to at
least begin addressing many of the major
concerns held by the
international community and human rights
groups.
Specifically Fonseka promises to (a)
abolish the Executive
Presidency, (b) reactivate the 17th
amendment to the
constitution, (c) end the culture of
'white van'
disappearances and extra-judicial
killings, (d) eliminate the
press council and establish an environment
of free media, (e)
return all remaining IDPs and double the
resettlement
allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees
) about USD$880 )
per family, (f) amend the emergency
regulations, and (g) deal
with all war-related detainees by either
prosecuting them,
releasing them or placing them in
rehabilitation programs.
FONSEKA THE ECONOMIST?
----------------------
¶3. (C) The economic portion of
Fonseka's manifesto contains
positive points on corruption and GSP
plus, but more populist
positions on salaries, product prices
and taxes. Fonseka
promises to appoint a powerful agency to
combat fraud and
corruption, create an independent
commission to audit public
finances, and pass a new Parliamentary
ethics code. Fonseka
also promises to ensure that the
European Union would not
revoke their GSP plus trade benefits,
but without disclosing
how he would achieve this. Fonseka makes
populist appeals by
promising to increase government
salaries by 10,000 Rs ($88
USD) per month. Rajapaksa countered with
a promise of a
2,500 Rs ($22 USD) raise. Fonseka
promises to provide
pensions for agriculture and fishery
workers. Fonseka plans
to reduce the fixed prices of certain
items and to bring down
the price of food, diesel and kerosene and
other essentials
by reducing taxes.
COLOMBO 00000021 002.8 OF 003
COST OF CORRUPTION ) THANKS TO USAID
------------------------------------
¶4. (C) One portion of Fonseka's
argument on corruption cites
statistics from a study partially funded
by a USAID grant,
entitled 'Impact of Corruption on
Poverty and Economic
Growth, 2007'. The manifesto does not
mention the role of
USAID in that study, and it is unknown
whether Fonseka
himself is aware of that connection. The
report states that
loss to corruption in 2006 amounted to
about 9 percent of the
2006 GDP of Sri Lanka.
HOW WILL HE PAY FOR IT?
-----------------------
¶5. (C ) Candidate Fonseka's economic
manifesto coincides
with the economic strategy described in
reftel C. Fonseka
does not mention any real reforms except
on corruption and
transparency. His promises to increase
salaries, lower the
cost of living and cut taxes sound good,
but he does not
provide any credible plan to accomplish
these goals. In such
a heated campaign environment, it is not
surprising that
Fonseka's economic manifesto reveals
more of his campaign
strategy than an economic program
following the election.
WHAT ISSUES WILL DRIVE THE VOTERS?
----------------------------------
¶6. (C) It is unclear how many votes
this manifesto will
garner. The language used in it is very
professional and
nuanced, and the arguments on corruption
appear convincing,
especially when coupled with other
documents floating around
Sri Lanka's e-mail network which detail
the corrupt financial
dealings of the Rajapaksa family. Post
is sending local
staff into the field to get a sense of
the political mood
outside of Colombo and will draw from
that reporting in
upcoming elections-related cables. So
far voters seem
largely interested in economic matters
and care much less
about security-related issues than they
may have some six
months ago when the war was still fresh
on everyone's minds.
While Fonseka may be short on specific s
for his economic
plan, it nonetheless is more detailed
than the Rajapaksa plan
thus far, and his attacks on the cost of
the Rajapaksas'
corruption may well resonate.
RAJAPAKSA IN JAFFNA
'END TO HIGH-SECURITY ZONES'
----------------------------
¶7. (C) President Rajapaksa visited
Jaffna on January 10, his
first visit there following the end of
the war. While there
he made several announcements, including
that the
high-security zones in the Jaffna
peninsula would be
dismantled, leaving only what was
described as a 'defence
front line'. Approximately 42 square
kilometers in the
Jaffna peninsula have been closed off as
high security zones
for a number of years, with some 80,000
persons displaced as
a result from their homes and
agricultural lands. It was
unclear when this would take effect, and
one media outlet had
reported some IDPs had already attempted
to enter one zone,
only to be turned back because the
formal authorization
removing the high-security zones had not
yet been received.
Sarath Fonseka had promised he would
eliminate all
high-security zones if elected when he
was in Jaffna
campaigning on January 2.
RAJAPAKSA PROMISES RELEASE
OF SOME DETAINEES
--------------------------
¶8. (C) While in Jaffna, Rajapaksa told
the local Catholic
COLOMBO 00000021 003.6 OF 003
Bishop that all LTTE suspects held on
minor charges would be
released, pending a review of their case
by the Attorney
General's office. Local media had been
reporting over the
weekend that some 700 of the ex-LTTE
combatants held in
Vavuniya since the end of the war had
been released. Post
contacts said by January 11 they were
still waiting for a
formal court order allowing their
release.
RAJAPAKSA MANIFESTO
-------------------
¶9. (C) President Rajapaksa released his
own manifesto
document on January 11. Post will report
in more detail in
the next elections update cable once a
full english
translation is obtained, but early
reports are that the
document is less specific in its promises
when compared with
Fonseka's manifesto.
COMMENT: WHO WILL WIN?
-----------------------
¶10. (C) This election is still very
much up in the air.
Polls here are very scattered and likely
to be statistically
unreliable, but anecdotal evidence shows
a growth in support
for Fonseka. Rajapaksa still has an
enormous advantage in
his illegal use of state resources, but
the idea of 'change'
is becoming the issue of the day, even
if Fonseka has not yet
provided specifics on how to achieve all
his promises of
change. Initial contact with voters in
rural areas shows a
focus on economic issues rather than
security.
COMMENT: IF FONSEKA, WHAT NEXT?
------------------------------
¶11. (C) Some local political analysts have
begun to entertain
scenarios of what might happen in the
Sri Lankan government
if Fonseka did win. Early opinions say
that the wide-spread
UNF coalition he has assembled had no
intention of staying
together for parliamentary elections.
Indeed Post local
political staff are finding that local
political organizers,
in particular those from the JVP, are
squirreling away
presidential campaign funds to use for
their own
parliamentary campaigns. The JVP is
showing its
organizational strength on the ground
and is likely to
benefit in general elections. Some are
saying that if
Rajapaksa loses, his family's fortunes
in the SLFP will end,
and it will revert back to its more
historic form. Rumors
have cropped up in the past week that
former President
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga may
announce her support
for Fonseka, with her son Vimukthi
Kumaratunga at her side.
This then would serve as Vimukthi's
entrance into the
political world, and a passing of the
torch to the next
generation of the Bandaranaike family,
which has been deeply
involved in Sri Lankan politics for some
300 years.
Interestingly, Mangala Samaraweera, seen
by many as the
brains behind Fonseka's campaign
strategy, also ran
Chandrika's presidential campaign and
was known as one of her
close confidantes. He is thought by some
to be a possible
candidate for Prime Minister in a
Fonseka administration.
End Comment.
FOWLER
